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I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs present the Court with a false choice: either impose a
drastic contempt sanction (such as shutting down all public schools) or
admit that the Court does not really care about constitutional rights. In
their telling, failure to impose a drastic sanction would be akin to the
Court approving of racial segregation, Japanese internment, or Nazi
propaganda. The Court should reject their bullying tactics and instead give
effect to the whole Washington Constitution, allow the Legislature room
to complete its task, and remain vigilant to ensure ultimate compliance
with the State's constitutional obligations. The issues in this case are too
important to give in to Plaintiffs' hyperbole.
Plaintiffs' first mistake (repeated by some Amici) is focusing on
the wrong issue as the basis for a contempt sanction. This Court held the
State in contempt for failure to enact a plan to meet the Court's 2018
deadline for constitutional compliance. The State has now enacted a plan
for meeting the deadline. Yet Plaintiffs and Amici argue for a new
sanction based on the State's alleged failure now to meet the 2018
deadline for constitutional compliance. That misdirection ignores that the
Court did not hold the State in contempt for failure to meet the ultimate
obligation. Basing a contempt sanction on failure to achieve ultimate
compliance would thus be premature and inappropriate.
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Plaintiffs and Amici also err in dismissing the State's enacted plan.
They argue that the plan is "meaningless" because it leaves important
decisions to the 2017 Legislature. But this is ultimately an attack on the
Court's original 2012 decision, which declined to order a specific,
immediate remedy and instead appropriately allowed the State time to
develop ways to meet the extraordinary new financial obligations
the ruling imposed. Plaintiffs and Amici also object to the plan's
requirement to study the actual costs of teacher compensation. But they
simultaneously criticize the State for allegedly not calculating the actual
costs of other subjects covered by this Court's 2012 ruling. They can't
have it both ways.
Ultimately, Plaintiffs offer soundbites rather than solutions.
Comparing the State to George Wallace may garner media attention, but it
does little to advance the issues in this case. This is not a situation where
the State denies its constitutional obligations; rather, members of the
Legislature (and public) disagree about how to meet those obligations.
This Court appropriately left it to the Legislature to try to reach agreement
on the appropriate combination of revenue enhancements, cuts to other
programs, and other changes necessary to comply with the State's
constitutional obligations. There is no basis for the Court to end that
democratic process before the deadline the Court itself imposed. And there

2

is certainly no basis to order the closure of public schools, harming the
very schoolchildren our constitution protects. Instead, the Court should
recognize that the State has enacted a plan, should purge the contempt
sanction, and should evaluate the Legislature's compliance with its
ultimate constitutional obligations on the timeline the Court imposed.
I.I. ARGUMENT

The issue before the Court is whether the State has complied with
the orders requiring it to submit a plan. The State has complied. The order
of contempt should be dissolved and the sanction terminated.
A.

There Is No Legal or Factual Basis for Imposing Additional
Sanctions
1.

The State has submitted a plan and therefore has
purged contempt

Plaintiffs and some Amici mischaracterize the Court's orders
finding the State in contempt and imposing sanctions by focusing on the
2018 deadline for compliance rather than the language of the orders.1 The
Superintendent of Public Instruction directs almost all his attention to new
sanctions that he believes should be imposed.

I See Plaintiff/Respondents' 2016 Post-Budget Filing (Pls.' Br.) at 43-49; SPI
Amicus at 2-3; Paramount Duty Amicus at 4. Amicus Arc of Washington focuses on
special education funding, essentially attempting to relitigate issues decided in School
Districts' Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Education v. State, 170 Wn.2d 599,
601, 244 P.3d 1 (2010). Their arguments are more properly raised in a new complaint.

The Court found the State in contempt for not submitting a plan—
not for failing to meet the 2018 deadline three years early. Order,
McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Sept. 11, 2014), at 4. The Court
imposed a sanction to coerce the submission of a plan—not to compel full
constitutional compliance before the 2018 deadline. Order, McCleary v.
State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015), at 1.
The State has submitted a plan, enacted as E2SSB 6195 (Laws of
2016, ch. 3), that identifies the final steps to be taken on the road to
achieving compliance by 2018. And in that plan the Legislature
categorically stated its intent to reform state funding of compensation to
provide "competitive salaries and benefits that are sufficient to hire and
retain competent certificated instructional staff, administrators, and
classified staff," "eliminat[e] school district dependency on local levies
for implementation of the state's program of basic education," and
complete its implementation of ESHB 2261 (Laws of 2009, ch. 548) and
SHB 2776 (Laws of 2010, ch. 236). E2SSB 6195, § 1. If it succeeds in
doing so, the State will be in compliance with the decision in McCleary v.
State, 173 Wn.2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (2012).
Alternatively, Plaintiffs would have the Court punish the State now
for not having produced a plan before 2016. Pls.' Br. at 32-33. But the

Court already imposed a sanction of $100,000 a day to continue until a
plan was enacted. A plan now has been submitted and the question before
the Court is whether it should dissolve its order of contempt and stop
further accumulation of the sanction now that a plan has been enacted.
In short, there is no basis on which to find the State in continued
contempt or for continuing the sanction. Before there can be any new
sanction, there must be a finding of new contempt. And before there can
be any of the draconian sanctions proposed by the Superintendent, there
must be a finding that the new or continuing contempt is so egregious as to
require such severe sanctions. The Court should reject the ongoing
attempts of Plaintiffs and some Amici to use the contempt order as a
vehicle for imposing a prospective sanction simply because they assume a
future failure to meet a deadline that is still two years away. See State ex
rel. O'Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wn.2d 85, 87, 436 P.2d 786 (1968) ("[ W]e

cannot pass on the constitutionality of proposed legislation ... until the
legislative process is complete and the bill or measure has been enacted
into law.").
2.

The attacks on the plan by Plaintiffs and Amici are
unfounded and legally in error

Lacking compelling legal critiques of the State's plan, Plaintiffs
instead try to bully the Court, arguing that acceptance of the plan would be

W

equivalent to approving of George Wallace's opposition to desegregation
(Pls.' Br. at 442), the World War II internment of Japanese Americans
(Pls.' Br. at 43 n.87, 49), or the Nazi propaganda machine (Pls.' Br. at 30
n.63). While such inflammatory rhetoric may be increasingly and
troublingly common in our nation's political discourse, it is unhelpful and
inappropriate here. The Court should reject Plaintiffs' inflammatory
rhetoric and focus instead on assessing the substance of the enacted plan.
At the end of the day, the issues in this case can be resolved only
by a Legislature whose members can come together to solve a particularly
difficult and complex problem with guidance from this Court. Plaintiffs'
inflammatory rhetoric does not move the bail forward. It is unnecessary,
counterproductive, and distracting.
a.

Plaintiffs and Amici fail to establish that
additional data and analysis are unnecessary

In criticizing the State's plan, Plaintiffs and some Amici argue that
no further information is needed. While they cite a variety of previous
studies going back to 1982 as important, they contend that the current
work of the Education Funding Task Force initiated by E2SSB 6195
cannot possibly be important or necessary. See Pls.' Br. at 33-34;
SPI Amicus at 3; Paramount Duty Amicus at 7.
2 See also Pls.' 2015 Br. at 10 (July 27, 2015); Pls.' 2014 Br. at 38 (May 21,
2014); Pls.' 2013 Br. at 39 (Sept. 30, 2013).

C

But neither Plaintiffs nor Amici have been able to unearth
and refer the Court (or the Legislature) to any current analysis that
(a) delineates district-by-district compensation paid beyond the state salary
allocations generated through the prototypical school model; (b) identifies
the funding sources of the additional paid compensation; and (c) reveals
the precise mix of basic education and local enhancement duties supported
by the additional pay.3 If those data are present in one of the studies
Plaintiffs and Amici reference, it should have been a simple matter to
identify it for the Legislature and the Court.
Presumably, Plaintiffs are well positioned and motivated to
identify such information, since they have argued repeatedly that the State
does not pay the actual cost of compensation necessary to support the
State's program of basic education. Instead, they provide a short list of
bills and reports issued between 1982 and 2012 and essentially tell the
Court to go search for the information. See Pls.' Br. at 5-6, 33-34.
The Superintendent suggests the information exists in the 2012
Compensation Technical Working Group Final Report, but does not
provide a citation showing where such information is to be found. SPI

3 E2SSB 6195, § 1, p. 2; Joint Education Funding Task, Jessica Harrell & Bryon
Moore, Salary Spending by School Districts: What We Know, What We Don't Know
(May 11, 2016), https:Happ.leg.wa.gov/CMD/document.aspx?agency=4&year=2016&
cid=17131&mid=25309&hid=193564—(web page, click on Other, click on Internal —
K-12 Compensation Overview Charts).
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Amicus at 3. Appendix 2 of the Final Report contains some minimal
information on funding sources in the form of three pie charts showing
percentages of 2010-11 average additional salary above state allocation.4
But the Final Report does not identify where the underlying data came
from, what level of detail is available by district, what services are
supported by the additional salary, or the source of the funding beyond
"local."
Amicus Washington's Paramount Duty claims that the State has
failed to explain why this study is needed, given the history of previous
studies. Paramount Duty Amicus at 7-8. Actually, the State did explain
and just did so again here. See E2SSB 6195, § 1; 2016 Reports at 8-10;
State's Br. at 11-14. Paramount Duty simply does not like the explanation.
Taken together, Plaintiffs and these Amici are arguing that they,
not the Legislature, know what information the Legislature needs in order
to craft and enact the best remedial legislative policy. The Legislature
itself, in a duly enacted statute, has made the determination that further
data collection is necessary for the Legislature's "`uniquely constituted
fact-finding and opinion gathering processes' [that] provide the best forum
4 Compensation Technical Working Group Final Report 81 (June 30, 2012),
http://www. k 12.wa.us/Compensation/CompTechWorkGroupReport/CompTechWorkGro
up.pdf (last visited June 16, 2016).
5 2016 Report to the Washington State Supreme Court by the Joint Select
Committee on Article IXLitigation (May 18, 2016).

8

for addressing the difficult policy questions inherent in forming the details
of an education system." McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 517 (quoting Seattle
Sch. Dist. I v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 551, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (Utter, J.,
concurring)). Plaintiffs would have the Court deny the Legislature the
opportunity to gather additional data and policy recommendations.
Paramount Duty also appears to argue that the State is estopped
from arguing any need for additional data because the State previously
argued to the Court that all the work that went into ESHB 2261 was a
better remedial solution than starting from scratch. Paramount Duty
Amicus at 6-7. There is no estoppel. The arguments are not inconsistent.6
The fact that decision-makers may need more detailed information as
plans progress from general to more specific is unremarkable and
unsurprising. The implication of Paramount Duty's argument is that less
information somehow leads to a better solution.
Plaintiffs and Amici reference prior reports and other documents as
if bare citation proves their argument. It does not. None of those prior
efforts assembled the information needed to determine the state funding
necessary to provide compensation adequate to attract and retain well

6 Paramount Duty mischaracterizes the State's argument from its 2010 brief. The
issue was whether, given the Legislature's recent enactment of ESHB 2261, the trial
court's remedy to start over was appropriate. This Court held that it was not. McCleary,
173 Wn.2d at 542.

E

qualified teachers and staff, to ensure accountability for the spending of
state dollars, and to do so over the long term. And none of those prior
efforts showed how school districts expend local levy dollars on staffing
and implementing the State's program of basic education. Until that
information is gathered, the Legislature cannot determine the amount of
the State's constitutional obligation.
b.

Under the tests set forth by Plaintiffs and Amici,
no plan could pass muster

A closer look at the arguments made by Plaintiffs, the
Superintendent, and Paramount Duty reveals that no plan could be
sufficient under their view and sanctions therefore should be levied for
failure to achieve compliance by 2016. They argue essentially that a plan
is a meaningless exercise (and always was a meaningless exercise)
because no plan, study, or legislation can bind a future Legislature. See
Pls.' Br. at 37 ("It's meaningless to say the 2016 legislature is `requiring'
the 2017 legislature to enact reforms...."); Pls.' Br. at 38 ("It is similarly
meaningless to say the 2016 legislature is `committed' to having the 2017
legislature comply with the court orders in this case...."). Under their
arguments, no plan or promise should be believed and the only way the
State could avoid sanctions is to have met the 2018 deadline in 2016.

10

The Superintendent argues that E2SSB 6195 is "demonstrably
unreliable" because it consists of "mere words of promise." SPI Amicus at
5-6. Paramount Duty makes a similar argument. Paramount Duty Amicus
at 6. That argument is untenable. Just because the Legislature has chosen
not to adopt each recommendation offered by the Superintendent or by
various task forces and commissions is no basis for concluding that the
commitment in E2SSB 6195 is "demonstrably unreliable." The
Legislature does not and cannot delegate legislative authority to such
groups. Nevertheless, it is well established that education reform to date
has been shaped by the results of numerous studies, as outlined by the
Court in McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 500-08. The fact that studies and
recommendations are not adopted wholesale and verbatim does not mean
that they failed to result in legislative action or did not provide an
important and necessary foundation for enacted policy changes.7
Washington Learns led to the Basic Education Finance Task Force, which
resulted in ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776. Id. at 505-10.
Although ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776 also were "mere words,"
under the Superintendent's argument, and have always been subject to

7

The Court acknowledged that the State is not bound to adopt precisely
the recommendations by various workgroups, because they do not provide the only
means of achieving compliance. Order, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Aug. 13,
2015), at 7.
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amendment by subsequent Legislatures, the State has followed through
with their implementation. As explained in the State's Brief at pages
16-21, the Legislature has met every deadline it established in those bills
and in doing so has increased annual funding over a four-year span by
billions of dollars.
C.

The State has not ignored the current sanction

Plaintiffs and Amici claim that new sanctions are necessary
because the State either did not take the current sanctions of $100,000 per
day seriously (SPI Amicus at 4), or did not consider the sanction
significant because the State "refus[ed] to fund it" (Pls.' Br. at 46). Such
claims are baseless. The current remedial penalty was levied by the Court
for failure to produce a plan in 2015. The Legislature enacted a plan in
E2SSB 6195 in 2016, as described in the State's Brief at pages 10-14.
That alone should be sufficient to rebut the bald assertion that the penalty
has been ignored.
Moreover, the plan enacted in E2SSB 6195 is already being
implemented. The Education Funding Task Force established in that
legislation has been moving ahead to complete its assigned
responsibilities. Its early focus has been on obtaining information in four
areas: (1) school district reporting and accounting procedures and data
received (and not received) by the Office of the Superintendent of Public

12

Instruction; (2) K-12 educator supply and demand issues; (3) what
information is or is not reported about salary spending by school districts
and the data collection tools necessary to obtain necessary but unreported
information about salary spending; and (4) differences between school
districts' actual staff allocations and staff allocations assumed in the
prototypical funding model.8
As directed in E2SSB 6195, the Washington State Institute for
Public Policy timely selected and contracted with a qualified consultant,9
who began work on May 31, 2016. The consultant is tasked with
(1) identifying and reporting reasons for and funding sources of
differences between actual salaries and those provided under the State's
prototypical school model; (2) identifying and reporting market rate
salaries comparable to each staff category in the prototypical school
model; and (3) developing a model tool to explore local labor market
adjustments and criteria for evaluating them. Data collection has begun.
Deadlines are set in E2SSB 6195, section 3: the consultant's interim report
is due September 1, 2016, and the final report and analysis is due
November 15, 2016.
S

See Joint Education Funding Task, http://leg.wa.gov/jointcommittees/
eftf/pages/default. aspx.
9 Third Sector Intelligence, Inc. (3Si), a Seattle consulting firm
(http://team3si.com/), in partnership with Edunomics Lab at the McCourt School of
Public Policy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (http://edunomicslab.org/).
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Neither has the executive branch ignored the sanction. On June 10,
2016, the Office of Financial Management released its Operating Budget
Instructions for the 2017-19 biennium. Both the cover memo and opening
instructions explain that state agencies should not expect increased
funding in the next biennium because of the need to fund the "continuing
costs of major K-12 funding enhancements made in the current biennium
and the final phasing in of legislative commitments to decrease K-3 class
sizes in the 2017-19 biennium" and the need to "further increase state
funding of K-12 school employee compensation at a cost of several billion
dollars next biennium (McCleary v. State of Washington)."10 "Meeting the
state's constitutional duty to fully fund K-12 education is an enormous
challenge and the top budget priority."11 This language, unprecedented in
its clarity, is a clear and affirmative response to the Court.
The State remains on track to achieve constitutional
compliance by 2018

3.

Plaintiffs' arguments are fundamentally flawed because they are
premised on their measures of ultimate constitutional compliance—not on

io Office of Fin. Mngt., Budget Div., 2017-19 Biennium Operating Budget
Instructions 2 (June 2016), http://www.ofm.wa.gov/budget/instructions/operating/
2017_19/2017-19instructions.pdf; Memo from David Schumacher, Director, Office of
Financial Management, to Agency Directors, Presidents of Higher Education Institutions,
and Boards and Commissions (June 10, 2016), at 1 (re 2017-19 Operating and
Capital Budget Instructions) http://www.ofin.wa.gov/budget/instructions/operating/2017_
19/covermemo.pdf.
11

Id
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measures established by this Court or the Legislature. The Washington
Constitution does not confer on Plaintiffs—or on the Superintendent of
Public Instruction, for that matter—the authority to, determine the measure
of ample funding under article IX, section 1. It is for the Legislature to
determine in the first instance what constitutes "ample provision" for the
State's program of basic education. And it is for the Court to determine
whether the Legislature's provision is constitutionally sufficient.
The Legislature is on the threshold of making that determination.
That threshold marks the culmination of a process reflected in the reforms
and deadlines established in ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776 and carried
forward in E2SSB 6195. Once the Legislature determines the real cost and
enacts implementing legislation, the Court can address whether the State
has complied with article IX, section 1, as directed in the McCleary
decision. If the Legislature fails to address the compensation challenge by
the deadline set in McCleary, the Court then could determine whether the
State failed to meet its constitutional obligation.
a.

The $4.8 billion increase in state spending for
K-12 education over two biennia is real

The State has made very real and concrete progress since 2012.
In attempting to discredit that progress, Plaintiffs wrongly claim that
the $4.8 billion increase in education funding between the 2011-13

15

biennium and the 2015-17 biennium is illusory and is actually less
than if the State had merely maintained the "status quo" level of
services. Pls.' Br. at 26. Plaintiffs' characterization of maintenance level is
erroneous for several reasons.
First, Plaintiffs argue that the State's published 2015-17
maintenance level of $19.5 billion reflects the "status quo" costs of
providing the same services funded in the prior biennium. They
misunderstand this budgeting term of art. In its 2014 Report, 12 the
Legislature's Article IX Committee provided an explanation of the term
"maintenance level" as used in the budgeting process.
The maintenance level budget is the estimated cost of
providing currently authorized services in the new budget
period. It is calculated using current ongoing
appropriations, application of any bow wave adjustments
(costs or savings that occur in the future because a current
budget item is not yet fully implemented), and adjustments
for caseload or enrollment or other funding driver changes
to mandatory programs.
2014 Report at 35-36. The funding driver adjustments in maintenance
level can include costs driven by new laws or new budget items being
phased

in.

It is not limited simply to the "status quo" of the cost of the

previous level of services adjusted for caseload. See also 2016 Report at
17 (like the MSOC allocation in the 2015-17 biennial budget, the
12

2014 Report to the Washington State Supreme Court by the Joint Select
Committee on Article Mitigation (Apr. 30, 2014).
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final increment of K-3 class funding will be included in the maintenance
level in the next biennial budget because it is statutorily mandated in
SHB 2776).
Having misunderstood the meaning of "maintenance level,"
Plaintiffs compound their error by arguing that $19.5 billion represents the
2015-17 cost of maintaining the "status quo" of the 2013-15 biennium
level of services. In fact, the voters' approval of Initiative 1351 in
November 2014 resulted in a sudden increase of $2 billion to 2015-17
maintenance level costs (an increase of over 11 percent). That $2 billion
increase temporarily brought K-12 maintenance level costs to $19.5
billion,13 but it represented new funding requirements that had not
previously been implemented. It was not a mere continuation of the
2013-15 level of service and it is incorrect to claim that the new
$19.5 billion total reflected the cost of continuing the "status quo."
Ultimately, the Legislature delayed phase-in dates for I-1351 for
four years and did not fund the initiative's class size allocations in the
2015-17 budget.14 Contrary to Plaintiffs' claims, this policy decision
neither decreased state spending nor decreased previously provided
" State of Washington, Legislative Budget Notes: 2015-17 Biennium & 2015
Supplemental 275 (Oct, 2015), http://leap.leg.wa.gov/leap/budget/Ibns/2015LBN.pdf;
State's Br. at 37.
is 2015-17 Budget Notes at 275 (reflecting decision to postpone I-1351
implementation as a policy-level reduction to maintenance level); State's Br. at 37.
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services. The enacted public schools budget for 2015-17 was $18.2
billion.15 That was an increase from the approximately $15.3 billion for
public schools in 2013-15, which had increased from approximately
$13.4 billion in the 2011-13 budget.16
In sum, the $4.8 billion increase includes adjustments for caseloads
and the new spending for MSOC, transportation, all-day kindergarten, and
K-3 class size reduction, as well as all the other education-related
increases that have been reported in the 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016
Reports and confirmed in the Budget Notes for each biennium. Plaintiffs
cannot show that the increases are illusory.
b.

All of the SHB 2776 reforms are fully funded
consistent with the schedule established in that
legislation

Plaintiffs repeat their arguments from 2015 that none of the
SHB 2776 reform elements are actually implemented, even where the
Court has said otherwise. For MSOC, transportation, and the highly
15

2015-17 Budget Notes at 277.
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2015 Report to the Washington State Supreme Court by the Joint Select
Committee on Article LV Litigation at 38 (July 27, 2015). Plaintiffs can be forgiven for
also getting the figure for the 2011-13 biennium wrong. With each supplemental budget,
appropriations are updated until, after the close of the biennium, actual expenditures are
available. More current fiscal data shows a figure close to $13.5 billion for the 2011-13
biennium. See 2013-15 Omnibus Budget Overview: Operating Only at 0-23,
http://leap.leg.wa.gov/leap/budget/lbns/2013operating1315.pdf. That figure does not
account for a one-time shift of apportionment of $115 million between fiscal years 2011
and 2012 that shifted 2009-11 biennium costs to the 2011-13 biennium as a
budget balancing effort during the fiscal crisis. State of Washington, Legislative
Budget Notes: 2011-13 Biennium & 2011 Supplemental at 273 (Oct. 2011),
http://leap.leg.wa.gov/leap/budget/Ibns/2011 lbn.pdf.
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capable programs, their arguments are simply that formulas are not good
enough, notwithstanding that (1) the Court held that the ESHB 2261 and
SHB 2776 reforms, if implemented, would remedy the constitutional
violation (McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 540-47); and (2) the Court and the
Superintendent subsequently recognized that transportation is fully funded
(Order, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015), at 5).
As to class size reduction and all-day kindergarten, Plaintiffs make
the same arguments, as if to re-litigate the prototypical school model as a
remedy, and then simply repeat language from the Court's August 2015
Order that there is "far to go" with regard to class size reduction.
Pls.' Br. at 21. In fact, the State demonstrated in its 2016 Report and Brief
that there is not so far to go. 2016 Report at 15-17, 30-34; State's Br. at
18-19. The Legislature has done everything it can do in this biennium to
ensure the last increment of K-3 class size reduction is funded as
scheduled in SHB 2776 for the 2017-18 school year. Plaintiffs' reference
back to the Court's 2015 Order is insufficient rebuttal.
C.

The Legislature is actively engaged in addressing
the need for additional teachers

Plaintiffs' arguments regarding teacher shortages assumes the
answer to that problem is simple. It is not. To quote H.L. Mencken,
every human problem has a solution that is "neat, plausible, and wrong."
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H.L. Mencken, Prejudices: Second Series 158 (1921). According to the
Professional Educator Standards Board (PESB), the current and projected
shortages have a number of root causes, some of them following national
trends, and some cyclical in nature. But while there are many theories,
"there are no easy answers."17
The PESB identifies a number of potential strategies for addressing
the issue, including changes in salary, local practices, routes to
certification, educator program production and eliminating other barriers
in the pipeline.18 Some of these can be pursued administratively by state
agencies and some require legislative action. Some were adopted by the
Legislature in 2016.19 The 2016 Report detailed a number of additional
investments made by the State to address the need for additional teachers.
2016 Report at 18. The Education Funding Task Force is also tasked with

forwarding recommendations as to whether any additional legislation is
needed to help support state-funded all-day kindergarten and class size
reduction. E2SHB 6195, § 2(3).

17

Prof 'I Educator Standards Bd., Addressing the Recurring Problem of Teacher
Shortages, https:Hdrive.google.com/a/pesb.wa.gov/file/d/OB-CWbSsnLOBgaOdDYmUze
VVkMnM/view?pref-2&pli=1 (last visited June 16, 2016).
18 Id.; Prof 'I Educator Standards Bd., Educator Workforce Supply and Demand
Issues (presentation to Education Funding Task Force, May 11, 2016),
https: Happ.leg.wa.gov/CMD/Handler. ashx?MethodName=getdocumentcontent&docume
ntld=wSTKSysjAs4&att=false (last visited June 16, 2016).
19

See n.17.
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B.

The Specific Sanctions Proposed by Plaintiffs or Amici Should
Be Rejected

Plaintiffs and their supporting Amici have lost sight of the basis for
the Court's order of contempt and imposition of sanctions. They would
have the Court consider the State to be in contempt for having not yet met
the 2018 deadline and ask the Court to impose sanctions on the
assumption that deadline will not be met. They offer a menu of possible
sanctions for the Court to choose from. No sanction should be imposed.
1.

"Close or defund schools"

Plaintiffs and the Superintendent again propose shutting down the
public schools as a sanction to compel legislative action. They again show
their willingness to directly harm the very schoolchildren they claim to be
advocating for as their means to an end.
Plaintiffs' approach is indirect. They ask the Court to issue an
order now that invalidates all "unconstitutionally funded school statutes"
on the first day of the 2017-18 school year if the Legislature does not
"choose to fully comply with the court orders and declaratory judgments
issued in this case." Pls.' Br. at 48. That would set a date for shutting
down schools. Putting aside the ambiguity of this request, its inevitable
effect would be to create immense uncertainty for schools, school
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children, teachers, and parents as they anticipate and plan for the 2017-18
school year. It would be especially problematic for students going into
their senior year with post-secondary plans. This is so for two reasons.
First, the ultimate legislative remedy likely will not be finally achieved
until late in the 2017 session as the budget is approved. Second, Plaintiffs
almost certainly will challenge the sufficiency of any action the
Legislature takes, and public uncertainty will continue until any such
challenge is resolved.
The Superintendent suggests a direct approach: simply enjoin
operation of the schools. SPI Amicus at 16-18. Just shut them down.
As Plaintiffs did before, the Superintendent cites Robinson v. Cahill
(Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 161, 358 A.2d 457 (1976), as a "successful"
model for the sanction they seek. Perhaps it is time to examine the claimed
"success" of that model more closely. To assist the Court, concise
summaries of the New Jersey litigation are provided in the appendix to
this brief.
In Robinson VI, the court ordered the shutdown of public schools
in New Jersey as of July 1, 1976, if the state legislature did not act to fund
a new public education act. The schools were closed, the legislature
enacted a new income tax, and the schools were reopened after eight days.
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Plaintiffs and the Superintendent end their story of the New Jersey
school funding saga at this point, arguing that closing the schools in
Washington will be just as effective in compelling a solution as it was in
New Jersey. Let's hope not, because the New Jersey saga did not end in
1976. More than forty years after the litigation began, the court was still
mandating specific educational reforms and managing their
implementation. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XXI), 206 N.J. 332, 20 A.3d
1018 (2011) (finding inadequate funding of education reform legislation).
Derivative litigation is still percolating in administrative tribunals and
lower courts. See Bacon v. New Jersey State Dep't of Educ., 443 N.J.
Super. 24, 126 A.3d 1244 (2015) (procedural dismissal of appeal). The
New Jersey saga continues.
The lesson of the New Jersey litigation, applied to the arguments
of Plaintiffs and the Superintendent should be unmistakable. Closing down
the schools in the summer of 1976 did prompt the New Jersey legislature
to enact a new tax. It did not result in full funding of the educational
reforms ordered by the court or in the cessation of litigation. Instead, the
court found itself locked in a decades-long conflict with the legislative and
executive branches, with the ultimate resolution still in doubt.
Moreover, a court-ordered closure of schools would result in courtimposed violations of federal law or the loss of federal funding. For
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example, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1482, guarantees children with disabilities access to "a free
appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs[.]" 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(d)(1)(A). The Act operates by providing federal funding to state
and local agencies and requiring them, as a requirement for funding, to
provide certain programs and services. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). If public
schools were closed in Washington, they could not satisfy their obligations
under the Act. Closing schools could jeopardize federal funding under
several other programs with cost-sharing requirements, including funding
for disadvantaged students (20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578), for students who
speak languages other than English (20 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6871), and for the
education of homeless children (42 U.S.C. §§ 11431-11435).
2.

"Strike, suspend, or enjoin tax preferences, credits, and
deductions"

The Superintendent suggests the Court could enjoin the operation
of "certain state tax exemptions, credits, and preferential tax rates" enacted
in the 2013, 2014, and 2015 legislative sessions. SPI Amicus at 11-12.
Plaintiffs appear to propose the same sanction. Pls.' Br. at 48. This
argument puts the Court on a slippery slope that slides across
constitutional limitations imposed by separation of powers. Under their
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approach, the Court could reach out to invalidate any statute enacted in
2013, 2014, or 2015 that has any effect on state revenue or spending. As
explained in prior briefing, the Court is not constitutionally free to assume
the legislative function. See State of Washington's Opening Brief
Addressing Order to Show Cause at 17-23 (filed July 11, 2011); State of
Washington's Reply Brief Addressing Order to Show Cause at 10-14
(filed Aug. 25, 2014).
Moreover, this proposed remedy, like others proposed by the
Plaintiffs and their supporters, asks the Court to sanction third parties as a
means to compel action by the Legislature, and to do so without regard to
the culpability or complicity of those third parties, and without regard
to the quality or magnitude of harm that might be caused.
Plaintiffs and the Superintendent apparently believe that enjoining
the operation of state tax credits and exemptions would be straightforward
and efficient. In fact, it likely would require substantial time and money to
implement such an injunction. Although their suggestion is sufficiently
abstract that an accurate assessment is not presently possible, we can
identify some issues and problems that would have to be addressed for any
such injunction to be workable and enforceable.
For example, the Superintendent suggests the Court could order the
Department of Revenue to simply "disallow any of the enjoined tax breaks
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that appear on tax returns filed with the Department." SPI Amicus at 14.
The Department receives over two million tax returns annually20 and
almost certainly lacks the resources to manually identify and review each
return in order to disallow deductions, exemptions, credits, and
preferences subject to injunction, and then to demand additional payment
from each taxpayer who claimed an "enjoined tax break." If a lack of
resources leads to inconsistent application of the injunction, the inevitable
result would be sharp increases in the numbers of taxpayer complaints,
requests for review, and lawsuits. If the Superintendent's goal is to
increase taxpayer dissatisfaction with government, he has identified an
effective approach to achieve that goal.
One potential alternative to the quick-fix approach suggested by
Plaintiffs and the Superintendent would be to allow the Department to
implement an injunction in the same manner as it implements a change in
tax law. That implementation would require time and money to train staff,
educate taxpayers, revise the state combined excise tax return and
instructions, reprogram software, and update taxpayer dispute and refund
procedures. In the normal situation, where enacted legislation has been
developed over time in consultation with the Department, that
implementation may take a couple of months (or longer if the changes are
20

http://dor.wa.gov/Docs/Pubs/Misc/RevenueAtAGIance.pdf.
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substantial). Implementing an injunction that affects scores of tax
provisions would have to be accomplished using existing Department
resources and could take many months.
Under either approach, affected taxpayers could bring lawsuits
alleging, for example, that the injunction violates their right to due process
by depriving them of a duly enacted deduction, exemption, credit, or
preference without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Businesses
would have to update their bookkeeping and accounting systems in
response to an injunction. They may need to revise contracts with
suppliers or customers, reprogram point-of-sale systems and online
transaction systems.
Plaintiffs and the Superintendent address none of these issues and
consequences. They expect the Court to resolve them.
3.

"Enjoin county treasurers from disbursing special levy
revenues to school districts"

The Superintendent suggests the Court could enjoin county
treasurers from disbursing revenues collected from special excess levies,
on the ground that the expenditure of such moneys in support of the
State's program of basic education violates article IX, section 1 and this
Court's decisions in Seattle School District and McCleary. There are at
least four significant problems with this proposed remedy.
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First, it rests on a mischaracterization of the contempt order and
sanction issued in this case. As explained above, the Superintendent is
focused on ultimate constitutional compliance, while the contempt order
and sanction were imposed to compel the submission of a legislative plan.
Second, it is overbroad. There is no evidence to suggest that
all special levy revenues are used to pay for basic education, but the
Superintendent's proposal would enjoin the payment of any school district
revenues from special levies.
Third, the only justification offered for the requested injunction is
as a contempt sanction. It would require a finding of contempt against all
295 school districts for a contempt sanction to be levied against them.
There has been no showing of the factual predicates for such a finding or
any judicial determination of unconstitutionality as to any specific school
district. All we have is the Superintendent's assertion in an amicus brief
that local school districts have "acted improperly" by using special levies
to pay for basic education. SPI Amicus at 10. On that basis, he asks the
Court to sanction all school districts without regard to their status or
culpability under the McCleary decision and orders.
Fourth, local school districts would have no ability to purge
contempt since, under the theory advanced by the Superintendent, it is
only the Legislature's action that can do so. See Int'l Union, United Mine
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Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826-27, 114 S. Ct. 2552,
129 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1994) (civil contempt sanction must give contemnor
opportunity to avoid the sanction); In re Pers. Restraint of King, 110
Wn.2d 793, 799-800, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988) (same); State v. Boatman, 104
Wn.2d 44, 48, 700 P.2d 1152 (1985) (same). The Superintendent would
punish school districts for the State's noncompliance.
4.

"Enjoin the expenditure of state funds for noneducation purposes"

The Superintendent suggests the Court could enjoin state spending
of non-education state moneys that are not constitutionally required or
necessary to preserve public health and safety. SPI Amicus at 15.
Plaintiffs make the same suggestion. Pls.' Br. at 48.
The Superintendent would identify spending to be enjoined using
state contingency planning done in 2015 in anticipation of a possible
government shutdown. Using that planning, the following programs and
services are examples of those that would be shut down or discontinued21:
•

Women Infants and Children (WIC) food and nutrition
programs.

• State medical services for the aged, blind, or disabled.
• Need grants for students at Washington universities.

21

See https:Hs3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2090195/
agency-contingency-plans-summary-2015.pdf.
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•

Opportunity grants for students at Washington community
colleges.

•

The State's health care program for undocumented children.

•

The Washington Department of Agriculture's food assistance
program and pesticide waste disposal program.

•

The Washington Department of Commerce's housing and
essential needs program and homeless services program.

• Non-emergency investigations of misconduct by health
professionals.
• HIV client services.
• Health inspections of shellfish operations.
•

The Washington Department of Health's kidney disease and
dialysis program.

•

State-only programs including funding for senior citizen
services, county community mental health, and individual and
family services for the developmentally disabled.

•

The Washington Department of Early Learning's working
connection child care program and some services providing
background checks.

•

Certain community outreach programs for veterans.

•

Distribution of state funding to local governments, used to
support local criminal justice agencies, emergency
communications, juvenile detention, mental health, and public
safety.

•

WorkSource offices.

• Vocational rehabilitation services.
• New applications for worker compensation benefits.
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•

The Office of Crime Victims Advocacy.

•

Transfer of new offenders from county jails to state
correctional facilities.

• Most community corrections services.
•

Response to requests for GPS tracking for sex offenders.

•

Fish and wildlife enforcement.

•

Fish hatcheries operation.

•

Certain sport and commercial fisheries.

•

State parks.

•

All activities relating to approximately two dozen business and
occupation licenses.

•

Complete shutdown of at least 32 state agencies.

Plaintiffs and the Superintendent display no concern for the public
value of these programs and services or for the people who rely on them.
Again, they have lost sight of the fact that making ample provision for
public schools is not the State's sole duty. The State has many other
important duties, from providing mental health treatment to feeding
hungry children, that have an impact on education. Children who are
hungry, homeless, or being abused are extremely unlikely to succeed in
school. See Columbia Legal Servs. Amicus. The State has a responsibility
to fund and oversee all of these obligations.
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5.

"Hold individual legislators in contempt and impose
monetary sanctions against them"

It would be an unprecedented and extraordinary intrusion on the
legislative branch to hold individual legislators in contempt for failure to
take action as legislators, and no case supports such a result. Though the
Superintendent advocates this approach, he cites no case in which this
Court (or any other State's court) issued a contempt order against any
individual legislator for action taken as a legislator, and he says nothing
about constitutional limits on the Court's power. This proposed remedy
lies outside the Court's constitutional power.
In their 2014 brief, Plaintiffs advocated this remedy, relying on
United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), in which the
United States sued the city for intentionally maintaining racial segregation
in residential areas and schools. The city ultimately entered into a consent
judgment, but the city council refused to enact a public housing ordinance
it had agreed to. The district court held the city and the four council
members who voted against the ordinance in contempt and imposed
financial sanctions, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United
States Supreme Court reversed this decision as an abuse of judicial
discretion because (1) the city council members were not named as
parties, (2) the "extraordinary" imposition of sanctions against individual
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council members should not have been imposed until sanctions imposed
on the city alone failed to secure compli-ance, and (3) considerations
supporting the legislative immunity doctrine must inform a court's
discretion in imposing sanctions. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265,
280, 110 S. Ct. 625, 107 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1990).22
Consistent with Spallone, any sanction directed toward individual
legislators here would be inappropriate because it could force legislators to
vote to serve their personal interests (getting out of contempt) rather than
the interests of their constituents and the public. Restrictions on legislative
freedom undermine representative democracy. Moreover, individual
legislators are not parties; Plaintiffs sued the State. And individual
legislators do not enact laws; for the State to enact a plan, pass a
budget, or fulfill its article IX duty, the Legislature must act collectively.
Const. art. II, § 22.
The doctrine of legislative immunity does not, of course, prevent
this Court from determining the constitutionality of the Legislature's
actions and ordering compliance. That power is beyond question. But
legislative immunity is an element of separation of powers. When the
Washington Constitution was adopted, the federal Speech or Debate

22

Because the order of contempt was ordered by a federal court, state
constitutional separation of powers limitations were not implicated.
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Clause was understood to protect legislators from any liability or judicial
action for their legislative votes. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
204, 26 L. Ed. 377 (1880). The framers of our Washington Constitution
presumably shared that understanding when adopting a state speech and
debate clause in article II, section 17.23 A contempt order here directed at
individual legislators or an order threatening or imposing sanctions on
individual legislators because of their legislative deliberations or votes
would violate article II, section 17.
Moreover, the Superintendent is asking the Court to use the threat
of sanctions to compel specific votes, which unmistakably invades the
authority vested solely in the Legislature by article II of the Washington
Constitution. See State ex rel. Distilled Spirits Inst., Inc. v. Kinnear, 80
Wn.2d 175, 182, 492 P.2d 1012 (1972) (the Legislature's plenary power
includes its power "to do those things necessarily incident to the
enactment of laws . the power is procedural as well as substantive").24
23

Article II, section 17 was taken from the Wisconsin Constitution [art. IV,
§ 16]. Robert F. Utter & Hugh D. Spitzer, The Washington State Constitution 72 (2d ed.
2013). The Wisconsin provision was drafted by its framers to "ensure the independence
of the legislature and the integrity of the legislative process by precluding the possibility
of intimidation or harassment of members of the legislature." State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d
122, 141-42, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984). That provision reaches legislators' actions that "are
within the regular course of the legislative process." Id. at 143-44. Deliberating on
legislation and casting votes on bills is squarely within the regular course of the
legislative process.
24

This Court has acknowledged the coequal status of the Legislature at least
since State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 462-63, 34 P. 201 (1893) (rejecting the
"false theory" that only the judiciary can be "entrusted" to enforce the constitution).
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In any event, there is more than just the Court's authority to
consider. When contemplating sanctions, the potential effectiveness of the
sanction to compel the desired outcome must be considered. Does the
Superintendent seriously believe that imposing monetary sanctions on
individual legislators would lead to legislative progress on school
funding? A more dispassionate observer of this case might reasonably
conclude that such sanctions would bring legislative progress to a
standstill.
III. CONCLUSION
The Legislature has not sat on its hands. Although the remaining
steps are big, the Legislature has been progressing along the path toward
compliance that this Court and the Superintendent identified as a remedy
for the constitutional deficiencies in 2012. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 484
(describing ESHB 2261 as a "promising reform package ... which, if
fully funded, will remedy deficiencies in the K-12 funding system"); id, at
543 (quoting testimony by the Superintendent of Public Instruction, in
which he agreed that ESHB 2261 would meet the State's constitutional
duty when fully implemented in 2018, if it was fully funded). It is not yet
2018 and the State has not completed its implementation of that
"promising reform package," but it has met every deadline along the
way and formally committed in E2SSB 6195 to meeting the final
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deadline. Because there is no legitimate basis for continuing the order of
contempt and the imposition of a sanction, there most certainly is no basis
for imposing a heightened sanction.
This Court should dissolve its contempt order against the State and
lift the sanction order imposing a daily penalty on the State.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of June 2016.
ROBERT W. FERGUSON
Attorney General
i

DAVID A. STOLIER, WSBA 24071
Senior Assistant Attorney General
ALAN D. COPSEY, WSBA 23305
Deputy Solicitor General
Office ID 91087
PO Box 40100-0100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
360-753-6200
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Appendix
Summary of Major New Jersey School Funding Litigation

Robinson v. Cahill
New Jersey Supreme Court cases, 1970-1976

• In 1970, a lawsuit challenged New Jersey's system of public school
funding, claiming it did not comply with the state constitutional
requirement to provide a "thorough and efficient" system of public
schools (N.J. Const., art. VIII, § 4). The New Jersey Supreme Court
held that the state's then-existing system of financing public
elementary and secondary schools violated the "thorough and
efficient" clause of the state constitution, because it produced gross
disparities in per-pupil expenditures, brought about by a substantial
reliance upon local taxes. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J.
473, 303 A.2d 273, cent. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). The court gave
the legislature until December 1974 to adopt remedial legislation.
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson II), 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973).
•

When the New Jersey legislature took no action, the court scheduled
additional briefing and oral argument, Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson
III), 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975), after which it imposed an interim
remedy in which it ordered a redistribution of education funds to
partially equalize the funding disparities for the 1976-77 school year.
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).
Two days before the interim remedy was to take effect, the legislature
passed the Public School Education Act of 1975, which contained a
new funding equalization mechanism. The Robinson plaintiffs
immediately challenged the Act, but the court held it was facially
constitutional, based on the assumption it would be funded. Robinson
v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976).

•

The legislature did not fully fund the Act because of political
opposition to a state income tax. In May 1976, over two extended
dissents, a divided court issued an order imposing an injunction that
would take effect on July 1, 1976, if the legislature did not enact
legislation to fund the Act by that date. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson
VI), 70 N.J. 155, 160-61, 358 A.2d 457 (1976). The conditional
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injunction enjoined all public officers in New Jersey "from expending
any funds for the support of any free public school," with certain
exceptions, beginning on July 1, 1976. Id. at 160. The legislature did
not act by July 1, 1976 and the injunction took effect. Alfonso
Narvaez, "Jersey Schools Closed by Court Order," New York Times,
July 1, 1976, at Al.
•

On July 7, 1976, the legislature passed a bill containing the state's first
income tax, and the governor signed it the next day. Alfonso A.
Narvaez, "New Jersey Votes State Income Tax; Byrne Signs Bill,"
New York Times, July 9, 1976, at Al. On July 9, at the governor's
request, the New Jersey Supreme Court lifted its injunction. Robinson
v. Cahill (Robinson VII), 79 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
Abbott v. Burke
New Jersey Supreme Court cases, 1981-2011(?)

• In 1981, an applied challenge to the 1975 Act was filed, again alleging
a violation of the "thorough and efficient" clause of the state
constitution.' Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 100 N.J. 269, 495 A.2d 376
(1985). After a remand for administrative fact finding, the court held
the Act unconstitutional as applied to poorer urban school districts
(which became known as "Abbott districts"). Abbott v. Burke (Abbott
II), 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990).
•

The legislature increased state appropriations to Abbott districts, but
the court found the increase unconstitutional because it did not assure
"substantial equivalence" among school districts. Abbott v. Burke
(Abbott III), 136 N.J. 444, 643 A.2d 575 (1994).

•

The legislature then enacted comprehensive reform legislation
containing new educational standards to define and assess a thorough
and efficient education, funding for regular education as defined by the
new educational standards, and funding for supplemental programs
determined essential in the Abbott districts. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott
IV), 149 N.J. 145, 693 A.2d 417 (1997). The court declared that

j The New Jersey Supreme Court itself seems to have recognized the
inevitability of further litigation following its final resolution of Robinson v. Cahill.
See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 119 N.J. 287, 300, 575 A.2d 359 (1990) (describing the
Abbott litigation as "[p]redictably flowing from our decision in Robinson v. Cahill, 69
N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976) (Robinson V)").
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legislation to be unconstitutional as applied to the Abbott districts and
remanded to the superior court to determine what judicial relief was
necessary. Id. 2
A special master devised recommended reforms, as did state education
and finance officials, which the court largely adopted in Abbott v.
Burke (Abbott V), 153 N.J. 480, 710 A.2d 450 (1998). The court
ordered the reforms implemented as quickly as possible.3
The plaintiffs continued to press their challenge. Two years later, the
court held that there were deficiencies in the implementation of
preschool education, but rejected the plaintiffs' request to order even
smaller class sizes. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VI), 163 N.J. 95, 748 A.2d
82 (2000). The court also clarified the state's funding responsibilities

2 Apparently, in response to the decision in Abbott IV, a third group of plaintiffs,
comprising rural property-poor school districts brought an action alleging the new
standards and funding violated the "thorough and efficient" clause of the New Jersey
Constitution as applied to them. See Bacon v. New Jersey State Dep't of Educ., 398 N.J.
Super. 600, 942 A.2d 827 (2008). That litigation has not so far made its way to the New
Jersey Supreme Court, but it was still active as of late last year. Bacon v. New Jersey
State Dep't ofEduc., 443 N.J. Super. 24, 126 A.3d 1244 (2015).

s The New Jersey Supreme Court took it upon itself to determine what reforms
would improve educational outcomes:
[W]e determine and direct that the [state Commissioner of
Education] implement whole-school reform; implement full-day
kindergarten and a half-day pre-school program for three- and four-year
olds as expeditiously as possible; implement the technology, alternative
school, accountability, and school-to-work and college-transition
programs; prescribe procedures and standards to enable individual
schools to adopt additional or extended supplemental programs and to
seek and obtain the funds necessary to implement those programs for
which they have demonstrated a particularized need; implement the
facilities plan and timetable he proposed; secure funds to cover the
complete cost of remediating identified life-cycle and infrastructure
deficiencies in Abbott school buildings as well as the cost of providing
the space necessary to house Abbott students adequately; and promptly
initiate effective managerial responsibility' over school construction,
including necessary funding measures and fiscal reforms, such as may
be achieved through amendment of the Educational Facilities Act.
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 153 N.J. 480, 710 A.2d 450 (1998). The court ordered these
reforms without any reference to or consideration of separation of powers or the
constitutional limits on its own authority.

3a

where school districts' circumstances changed over time. Abbott v.
Burke (Abbott VII), 164 N.J. 84, 751 A.2d 1032 (2000).
•

The state Department of Education developed a new preschool
curriculum strategy, but plaintiffs challenged the pace of
implementation and alleged other shortcomings. The court ordered the
Department to meet its deadlines and make other improvements.
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VIII), 170 N.J. 537, 790 A.2d 842 (2002).
But four months later, the court granted the Department's request
to "relax the remedies for K-12 programs" for one year because of a
state budget crisis. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IX), 172 N.J. 294, 798
A.2d 602 (2002).

•

When disputes arose regarding Department proposals to improve
implementation of "whole school reform," the court ordered
mediation, which led to agreement on all disputed issues except
whether the "relaxation of remedies" could extend another year
because of the continuing state budget crisis. The court approved the
agreement in Abbott v. Burke (Abbott X), 177 N.J. 578, 832 A.2d 891
(2003), and allowed the relaxed remedies to continue for another year
under a series of administrative and procedural requirements. Abbott v.
Burke (Abbott XI), 177 N.J. 596, 832 A.2d 906 (2003).

•

The court issued three decisions the following year addressing other
disputes and issues that arose. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XII), 180 N.J.
444, 832 A.2d 185 (2004); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XIII), 181 N.J.
311, 857 A.2d 173 (2004); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XIV), 182 N.J.
153, 862 A.2d 538 (2004).

•

In 2005, when the Department failed to file its annual facilities report
and most school districts did not meet the deadline for filing longrange facilities plans, the court set new deadlines and ordered the
Department and the school districts to comply with them. Abbott v.
Burke (Abbott XV), 185 N.J. 162, 889 A.2d 1063 (2005).

•

In 2006, the Court issued two orders addressing school districts'
responsibility to file budget requests consistent with the revenue
sources set out in the state's budget and their ability to appeal
inadequate funding. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XVI), 187 N.J. 191, 901
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A.2d 299 (2006); Abbott v. Burke, 203 N.J. 157, 1 A.3d 602 (2006).4
The court denied two subsequent requests by the plaintiffs for remedial
relief. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XVII), 193 N.J. 34, 935 A.2d 1152
(2007); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XVIII), 196 N.J. 451, 956 A.2d 923
(2008).
•

In 2008, the New Jersey legislature enacted yet another new funding
formula, which the plaintiffs challenged. The court declined to afford
the new formula a presumption of validity, placed the burden on the
state to demonstrate constitutionality, sent the case to a special master
to develop an evidentiary record, and required the state to continue
complying with the court's orders pending a decision on the
constitutionality of the new legislation. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XIX),
196 N.J. 544, 960 A.2d 360 (2008). After receiving the special
master's report and the arguments of the parties, the court held that the
new legislation was constitutional, contingent on adequate funding and
further review after implementation. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XX), 199
N.J. 140, 971 A.2d 989 (2009).

•

Two years later, the court, in a split decision (three justices in the
majority, two dissenting, and two not participating), found that the
state had not fully funded the new formula and ordered the state to
provide full funding to the Abbott districts in future appropriations.
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XXI), 206 N.J. 332, 20 A.3d 1018 (2011).
Abbott XXI appears to be the most recent decision issued in that case.

4 Because of a publisher's error, the second 2006 order was not published until
2010. Perhaps for that reason, that order is not assigned a Roman numeral in New Jersey
citations to the Abbott decisions and orders.
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